Russia is The Invisible Guest at the Washington Conference

Power of Republic, Though Silent, Will Be Felt in the Deliberations

Russian Policy of Allies, Particularly French, Will Have Important Bearing Upon Future History of Europe; Reaction in Country if Bolsheviki Are Overthrown Will Depend Upon Present Attitude of Nations

By Manya Gordon Strunsky

RUSSIA will be "the invisible guest" at the disarmament conference in Washington.

Every statement will be aware of her powerful grip. Allied policy toward Russia has been before the footlights of world history since the overthrow of the autocracy of Nicholas II in 1917. It has been a huge spectacle, varied both in atmosphere and action; comprising naval and military operations, conferences, conversations, missions, commissions and all the other elements that go into the making of a successful international show. Nevertheless, the audience remains displeased. At no time during these four years of serious preoccupation with Russia have the Allied statesmen succeeded in retaining for any considerable period the good will or confidence of the thinking public.

A graph of the public's reactions toward the different phases of the Entente Russian policy would have the appearance of a very erratic fever chart. For example: the Allied promise to Kerensky in the summer of 1917, concerning the restatement of peace terms, whipped up Liberal hopes to the point of delirium. But Mr. Bonar Law's declaration in Parliament soon after that the Entente intended to do nothing of the sort brought a rise in temperature among Conservatives and a corresponding drop in the opposing camp. And so the fluctuations have continued up to the time of writing, without the slightest indication of progress.

Discontent with Entente statesmanship upon this score is general. But public opinion is mistaken in its impression that the Entente handling of the Russian situation has been slipshod and unintelligent. The error has been a serious one.

Inability to comprehend the objective of Allied statesmanship removed the check that intelligent public opinion in the United States and the associate nations might have exercised. We are not over-suspicious of mere stupidity. Nevertheless, the situation made it possible, as we shall see, for Mr. Lloyd George and other statesmen to make use of this avowed confusion of the public mind to shift from side to side and so obscure the real object which remained constant.

Public Mind Confused As to Policy Toward Russia

This is not meant as a reflection upon Allied statesmanship. The Entente did not purposely set out to confuse the public as to its attitude toward Russia. But the public eye was focused upon the interests of the Russian people and for that reason lost touch from the very beginning with the objective of Entente statesmanship, which was inspired by individual national interest rather than by good will toward Russia.

In this sense even when an Allied statesman made a stand for Russia, the ultimate purpose was selfish—though justifiably selfish.

This explains the difference between Clemenceau and Lloyd George in early 1918, when Germany held out the temptation of a mutually advantageous peace—at the expense of Russia. Lloyd George was inclined to give ear. Clemenceau said "No." The British statesman was thinking of the British Empire, her commerce, her Indian possessions and how desirable a weak Russia might be. But France held the attention of Clemenceau. His unwillingness to accept the German offer cannot be ascribed to his love for Russia, but rather to French hate of Germany. A weak Russia meant a stronger Germany, the very evil that bleeding France was bent upon destroying. Mr. Walter Lippman, who cannot be accused of an ardent admiration for M. Clemenceau's policies, has assured his readers that the Premier's position at that time in regard to Russia makes him a great historic figure. However, the fact that M. Clemenceau was only serving the best interests of France, and by so doing benefited humanity, does not lessen the significance of his motives. His policy was a logical continuation of Franco-Russian relations antedating the World War. An elementary knowledge of the Franco-Russian alliance should not only clarify this critical period in the history of the war, but should likewise explain the subsequent attitude of France.

The defeat of France in 1870 and the establishment of the third republic were directly responsible for the Franco-Russian alliance. Republican France, unhappy because of her precarious internal condition and distracted by fear of further German aggression, sought protection in an alliance with autocratic Russia. Alexander III was no less conscious of the rising German power and consequently welcomed the union with France. The need of protection against German aggression was the same for France and Russia but their methods differed vastly. The alliance concluded, France retired to the position of the silent partner. Bestowing on her autocratically the freedom of her purse she left him to his own devices. Reaction was rampant in Russia, but republican France saw it not. She was too preoccupied with her own anxieties to sympathize with the Russian people as against the Russian government. She thought it needful to humor her protector or at least not to irritate him.

To this policy France adhered during the entire period of her alliance with Russia. And those who would take her against one or the other of them."

Even this overbold deed, which seemed to menace her national existence, did not rouse France to action. Having accepted the position of the weaker partner, hers was not to reason why.

This attitude is important because it will help to an understanding of French psychology concerning her present relations with Poland. Her status has changed, to be sure, also her attitude. She has come out of the World War victorious. But she cannot expect as much sympathy for her chosen associates as for herself. Nor can she any longer escape responsibility for the follies they are permitted to perpetrate in the name of a buffer state. Yet, whether or not one approves the French attitude toward Russia during the last three years, it is well to remember that victory has not removed the shadow of fear from her. Because of the fear France, as she contemplated Russia in the grasp of the Soviet autocracy with no sign of relief, finally yielded to the idea of the "sanitary cordon." So long as France was expecting succor from a union with Russia, she held out for a united Russia. Once she abandoned the idea of partnership with Russia and put her trust in Poland this ceased to be a necessity. On the contrary, she saw at once that her new alliance would be meaningless in the presence of a united Russia. The moment France put her faith in a comparatively weak Poland, she automatically assented to the disintegration of Russia for the aggrandizement of Poland. Having taken the leap the rest was quite simple. It must have become commonplace to every Frenchman that the Polish buffer state would be built on sand so soon as a powerful Russian blast was permitted to strike it. At the present moment France believes that she can bridle the northern wind, or, rather, that Poland can do it for her.

Thus in her overpowering anxiety to safeguard her national interests against Germany France has added Russia to her antagonists. True to precedent, having made her choice of an ally, she has consented to full acquiescence. This would explain the entire attitude of Poland and her first peace terms to Russia, which were in direct opposition to the decisions of the peace conference.

Poland, not satisfied with demanding nine Russian provinces in addition to the territory she had received from the peace conference, further demanded that Russia "indemnify Poland for the devastation of lands and industries caused by the overunning of Poland by the Russian armies since 1914." That is to say, Russia was to pay for the privilege of having helped to make the to task for not using her influence on behalf of a more liberal system in Russia must remember that so formidable was her fear that she not even dard to protest against the flirtations which the Russian autocrarcy carried on with the very enemy against whose aggressions Russia was pledged to protect France. Nicholas II's friendship with William II went as far as the Potsdam Agreement (1910), wherein the two monarchs were pledged "not to belong to any combination of powers formed Polish nation possible.

Questions Entente Policy If Red Rule Is Overthrown

Consider the folly of the unconscionable favoring of Poland or any other government at the expense of Russia. This would only be a short-sighted surrender to an immediate aim. It is apparent to all thinking men that Russia cannot remain in the grip of Bolshevik rule much longer. She must and will throw off the monster that is the cause of her present misery and humiliation. Under these conditions what would be the result of any concessions that the Soviet government might be compelled to make? Assume that in order to retain power a bit longer Lenine would accept any terms. Will it not become obligatory on the Entente powers to maintain the Soviet oligarchy in power, so that they might retain the advantage of the sinister peace? It cannot escape Allied statesmen that in the event of a change of government in Russia that government cannot respect the agrements—suicidal for Russia—that the Bolsheviki may enter into. What will be the Entente attitude then? Are the Allies prepared to force upon the Russian nation a Bolshevik-made peace?

Entente policy toward Russia has been shaped by France and England. The attitude of France, as we have seen, although guided by purely national interests, is on the whole obvious—above board. Always mindful of her peculiar geographical position and her peculiar danger, France held out for a united Russia until she became convinced of Russia's complete collapse and her inability to serve France. Then she accepted the alternative, the disintegration of Russia and the aggrandizement of Poland. So that French policy has not been so vacillating or so confused as we usually assert.

The British position is a great deal more complicated. England's dependence upon Russia was obviously not so close. Notwithstanding M. Millerand's assertion that "when Paris is in danger, London is not safe," England is not overafraid. Mr. Lloyd George must be aware that the first city to be in danger will be Paris. England, being much more secure, could take more time for reflection. She could avoid sharp transitions such as France undoubtedly made when she decided upon a break with Russia. Mr. Lloyd George manipulated his policy with great skill. He has been in turn, and at the right time, the friend of the interventionists, in favor of the blockade, against intervention, for the removal of the blockade, and for peace with the Soviet government. And, amazing though it may seem, the Premier has used the various groups of sentiment so judiciously that each in turn has claimed him as its friend. He has chosen his position so well and has reared his diplomatic edifice with so much artfulness that even at this late hour the public is unable to grasp the purport of his policy toward Russia.

But here again it must be stated that the fault does not lie with Mr. Lloyd George, but rather with the public. Underneath the changes in tactics there has been a simple strategy. If, in order to understand the British objective, we were to turn from Esthonia, Latvia and Poland, etc., where British interests are commercial only, to her Asiatic empire, we would most likely arrive at a clearer understanding of the issue. The pro-Soviet "Manchester Guardian" objects to a united Russia, because of its proximity to India and the consequent anxieties and expenditures. Upon the point of safeguarding the British Indian possessions Mr. Lloyd George is of one mind with "The Manchester Guardian."

Poland and the Baltic cordon have still to prove that they can keep Paris from harm. But they have already proved themselves an instrumentality for mischief in Russia. If one were to define the results of the anti-Soviet barrier policy it would run something like this: A number of small nationalities, some of them torn out of the very heart of Russia, are dominated by an ambitious and aggressive Poland, independent only in their freedom to wrangle with one another and coerce Russia. The result of foreign coercion in Russia cannot be other than to reduce still further, if that is possible, the vitality of the Russian people. A Russia continuously in turmoil will have no time for internal reconstruction. Nor will the Slav people be in a position to gather sufficient strength for the overthrow of the Soviet regime and the establishment of a democratic government.

Believes Allies Prefer Turmoil in Russia at Present

What is more, as the struggle among the Allied nations for industrial supremacy develops the Entente would rather not have a constructive, efficient government in Russia. If Russia and the border states can be kept in a turmoil the Allies will be by that much ahead in the race for reconstruction. Thus France and England are of the same mind concerning their attitude toward Russia, but Mr. Lloyd George had the skill to steer his course so as to conciliate the diverse elements of public opinion in his country. His methods were out of necessity somewhat erratic, but the end was quite the same—a Russia reduced to "harmlessness."

Internal conditions among the Entente nations make a firm stand against Bolshevism as a general principle imperative. As far as Russia was concerned intervention and the blockade were of no avail against the Bolshevists. On the contrary, they were even more effectual than the Red Guard in keeping Lenine in power. But intervention and blockade against Lenine were a moral demonstration against "revolution" at home. That is why Allied intentions went just far enough to symbolize a general abhorrence of Bolshevism, but never far enough to help the Russian people effectively against its Bolshevist rulers.

Lloyd George never tired of asserting that England must not abandon "friends" in Russia. But the Entente statesmen were careful not to embarrass their friends with too much aid. This in a great measure accounts for the frequent fluctuations in the military fortunes of Kolchak and Denikine. They invariably exhausted the supply of Entente help when they were at the point of succeeding. The success of these generals would not have meant anything to the Russian people in the way of freedom, yet for a time the Entente considered affiliation with them expedient—up to a certain point.

It must be admitted that as a demonstration to the people at home of the governments' hostility toward Bolshevism intervention in Russia was not effective. But in Russia proper it was the cause of untold misery. The only ones who derived actual profit from Allied intervention were the Bolsheviki. It gave them a reason for conscription, it consolidated their forces and made it possible for them to shift responsibility for their work of economic ruin and their tyrannous methods by attributing the cause to intervention. Allied intervention helped more to entrench the Bolsheviki in Russia than anything else, with the probable exception of the blockade.

Whatever aid to the Russian people the Entente statesmen intended by way of intervention, the absurdity of the blockade must have been apparent to the Allied leaders. But home conditions among the Allied nations called for decisive action. In the mind of the man in the street the blockade was associated with the effect it had had in crippling German militarism. Anxious to placate the man in the street, the Allied statesmen made use of the blockade against Russia, knowing quite well that the public was too ignorant of Russian affairs to grasp the vast difference between the conditions of food supply in Germany and Russia. Germany at the summit of her supremacy on the Continent, before the World War, was unable to feed herself without supplies from abroad. She used to import annually from Russia alone vast quantities of cereals, eggs and three-quarters of the butter she consumend, whereas Russia never imported foodstuffs. On the contrary, she was the reservoir for the requirements of Europe.

Rusia's Export Reports Showed Vast Resources

A mere glance at Russia's export trade prior to the war will demonstrate even more concretely the impossibility of starving Russia by means of a blockade. Before the war Russia supplied three-fourths of the export wheat of Europe. Besides meeting her home needs she exported huge quantities of sugar. In the cultivation of livestock she surpassed every country in Europe, supplying half the horses of the Continent. Russia led all other nations in the cultivation of cattle and was inferior only to Germany in the number of hogs. Russia produced the greatest quantity of wool next to England. She used to supply four-fifths of the coal and pig iron she consumed, 52 per cent of the agricultural machinery and implements and nearly all the steel; and, what is even more striking, her railroads were supplied with homemade rails. The blockade is not responsible for the condition of the railroads under Soviet rule but rather Lenine's need of war materials. The munition factories consume the supply of materials which would otherwise aid in maintaining the railroads. Russia's lack of cotton is likewise attributed to the blockade. In 1914 her cotton output, exclusive of Russian Turkestan, was surpassed only by the United States and England. Besides exporting to Asia and Rumania, she had nearly enough for her own national needs. Contrary to the declarations of our would-be authorities, Russia offers no market for foreign cotton excepting the very fine fabrics. When the peasant speaks of cotton he means his own home product.

In view of these facts it is quite clear that the blockade is not responsible for starvation in Russia To be sure, the blockade might have been instrumental in keeping machinery, coal and woolens from Russia. These are the commodities she most needs. But as a result of the war Europe had neither coal nor woolens and, until very recently, no machinery to export. What is more, had the Bolsheviki not succeeded in demoralizing the Russian mines along with the rest of her industries, Russia would have had more coal than the Allies. The cause of Russian starvation is neither the blockade nor yet the ruined condition of her railroads. It is the result of the war and three years of Bolshevik rule. The bad condition of the railroads is not the core of the difficulty. The roads are indeed in a deplorable condition. But one must be careful not to judge them by European or American standards. At any rate, the Soviet government seems to find enough cars and rails for the use of the army. The trouble is not, therefore, lack of transportation facilities, but the use they are put to.

But even if Russia had the necessary transportation facilities her people still would be starving, for the simple reason that there is a shortage of food in Soviet Russia. Russian agricultural production has been reduced to a minimum. The antagonistic attitude of the peasants toward the Bolsheviki is only in a measure responsible for this condition. The peasants have no confidence in the Bolsheviki. The peasants who seized the rich land owners' land are in doubt as to their right of ownership. Certain that the Constituent Assembly would have made the ownership of their land legal, they blame the Bolsheviki for this condition. The destruction of the war is another cause of peasant discontent. Under the regime of Nicholas II every village or mir owned its agricultural machinery. The peasant was too poor to buy his own implements. If this was an economic fact in 1914 it became even more the case after the Bolsheviki got into power.

At first the peasants kept up the standard of production as best they could, but hid their crops. Whereupon the Soviet authorities established their system of espionage through the so-called committees of the poor, and the policy of forced requisition of food. Realizing that their crops would be taken from them, the peasants ceased to produce any more than was necessary to meet their personal needs. The Bolsheviki soon discovered their predicament. In June, 1919, Lenine told the Soviet Congress in Moscow that it was necessary to make peace with the peasants, and abolish the committees of the poor. They were abolished, but it was too late. The destruction of the mir and the organizations of the masses and the consequent peasant opposition to Bolshevik rule are the real cause of starvation in Russia. But whatever the cause, one thing is obvious: It cannot be true that Russia is starving and is at the same time able to meet the shortage of food in western Europe.

Then why, it will be asked, have the Allied statesmen until very recently used Russia's mythical stores of provision as an argument for the lifting of the blockade? Because the Entente statesmen could not explain to their constituents that the real reason for the blockade—the danger of a Bolshevik epidemic in Europe—had disappeared, and that the Allied nations were getting ready for the revival of commerce. The continuance of the blockade was fast becoming an absurdity, it was beginning to affect their own interests. They are by this time convinced that the Soviet autocracy has derived aid and comfort from the blockade, inasmuch as it has been instrumental in beguiling the Russian people and diverting its attention from the real issue—Bolshevik incompetence. Finding that under present conditions the lifting of the blockade would serve their own national interests and aid the people of Russia in its struggle with Bolshevism, the Entente statesmen have decided upon its removal. But in order to satisfy public opinion, which might interpret the move as a concession to Bolshevism, Allied statesmanship had so long as it was possible concealed the issue by bringing forward the world's need of Russia's supplies. Hence the much advertised quantities of food in starving Russia.

But whatever dictated the various changes in Entente policy toward Russia hitherto present conditions demand a definite and honest position. This is the crucial moment when the Allied statesmen have it in their power to make either a friend or enemy of the Russian people. To satisfy any nation's ambitions by conceding the general scheme for the dismemberment of Russia might be profitable as an immediate expedient, but it will not elicit the good will of the Russian people. The disintegration of Russia, even if it were possible of accomplishment, would be attended by very serious dangers to the peace of Europe. For it is one thing to tear a nation apart and quite another to keep it apart. The history of Poland itself proves the futility of such undertaking. If Poland, after centuries of obliteration, could rise again what possibility is there of destroying a nation like Russia? "The Russian soil is made for unity; nowhere do we find so vast an area so thoroughly homogeneous." This was the judgment of Leroy Beaulieu a generation ago. The truth of Leroy Beaulieu's observation must be apparent to every one with a knowledge of Russian conditions. Russia is homogeneous, and if divided can only be kept apart by continuous turmoil such as rends her now.

It is inconceivable that the Entente nations should desire to prolong the present misery in Russia. For the sake of peace of Europe and the Entente's own good the Allies must retain the friendship of the Russian nation and not force an alliance between Russia and Germany and possibly Japan. Aladdin's lamp is at present in the possession of Allied statesmanship in Washington and they can wish for either a united, democratic, friendly Russia or make of her the instrument for future wars and untold misery.

Japan's Rockefeller



Viscount Shibusawa

War Between Japan and America Is Unthinkable, Says Shibusawa

Viscount, "Grand Old Man" of Business, Declares Growth of Hostile Feeling Between Nations Would Be Inexcusable and a Disaster to His People and to World. Confident Differences Will Be Adjusted

By Edward Marshall

JAPAN'S grand old man of business is the distinguished Viscount Shibusawa.

Among the wealthy people of Japan and one of her most careful students of industrial and political problems, he spoke to me to-day, apparently, with absolute frankness in his apartment at one of New York's great hotels, declaring without the slightest hesitation that war between the United States and Japan is as "unthinkable" as the President has said he holds war between Britain and America to be.

He is in the United States not officially as a delegate to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, but certainly as an observer whose reports to his home government and more especially to the people of his nation will be of the utmost importance.

The apartment in which we talked had been painfully American when he moved into the suite of which it is the drawing room—bare, coldly decorated.

But the love of all Japanese for flowers evidently is strong in the heart of this kindly faced, intelligent old man, and everywhere were blossoms. They made the room a bower. Nine growing, flowering plants stood on tables, the mantel shelf and floor, and in addition there were half a dozen vases of cut flowers.

The viscount is unassuming in his manner and entirely conventional in dress, wearing a black frock coat, a white, low turned-down collar and black bow tie, with ends carefully tucked under.

His face is that of a man who has lived carefully for many years without even minor self-indulgence. It is not particularly characteristic of his race. Indeed, study of it made me think that had it not been for the typical though wholly straight eyes it never would have suggested to me his Japanese nativity.

Viscount Insists That He Is Not a Statesman

"I am not, you must understand," the viscount said to me, smilingly, "a statesman. I am a business man and banker, but retired seven years ago, and I am endeavoring to make the years of my retirement useful, not only to my own country but to the world.

"If I could make them useful to the United States, the nation which, as all Japanese are shown by their histories, has been a great and daring leader of thought and originator of democracy, I should be very glad indeed.

"For six years I have been without any special business and during those six years I have become particularly interested in the relationships between my country and America.

"Probably I shall not attend in Washington during the entire length of the conference. But I shall try while I am in the United States to gather information which will be valuable to my country and my countrymen when I return to my home.

"The situation, I truly feel, is a tragic one. The former relationships between Japan and the United States were beautiful. The present relationships, tinged as they are with doubt and distrust on both sides, are deplorable.

"What has brought this about?

"I believe the fault lies with both countries. Neither can be blamed solely.

"The hopeful thing is that, you may be certain, the Japanese stand ready to remedy all the faults on their part, to correct all past mistakes.

"I do not speak for my government, but I can speak for the heart of the Japanese people. They are more than anxious to correct all their past mistakes.

"You note that I accept, for Japan, the commission of grave faults. It is not impossible that Americans also have fallen into some slight errors of procedure and interpretation.

"It is a comfort to me to reflect that in America, as in Japan, exists an intellectual group determined to bend every effort toward the correction of all misunderstandings of this sort.

"If we could but make these two small groups large ones, in other words, if we could get all or a majority of the intellectual people in both countries to study the great problem which has risen, I am convinced that within a time extremely short, we would find that there is no problem, actually, in existence, or, at least, that there is none which might not easily be solved.

Influences Are at Work to Strain Nations' Relations

"Certain influences surely are at work both in your country and in my own definitely striving to defeat every effort tending toward a Japanese-American friendship. I am inclined to think that many people, and some able ones, have been employed to cause misunderstandings.

"During the war the Germans worked or employed others to with the idea of straining Japanese-American relations. Perhaps they have worked similarly since the war came to an end. That is but natural and to be expected—of the Germans.

"And also it is true that neither nation, not Japan and not America, has worked definitely to create an understanding among the people of the other country. That, I think, is a great pity.

"One thing Japan did which was, I think, intelligent. This was to send to the United States Viscount Ishii.

"Viscount Ishii's visit to this country cleared the American mind, I think, suspicions which had been implanted for the time being at any rate, of the there by clever German misrepresentations, and returning to Japan he made the fact of real American friendship clear to the Japanese.

"No sooner were these unfortunate matters cleared away, however, than other influences sought to profit by producing a breach of that strong friendship which should exist between America and Japan.

"Rumors which I am certain were not altogether unfounded became prevalent that China, or, at least, some Chinese, had begun to sow the seeds of more misunderstandings in the minds of both your people and my own.

"I have been unable to pick up concrete facts which would establish this before a court, but I do not hesitate to voice my firm belief that what I have here intimated is the fact.

"Just now the mischief has been done, by whom particularly I do not attempt to say. But surely it has been attempted and to some extent accomplished.

"It is the way of gentlemen not to express doubts when the facts which would justify them cannot be laid hold of definitely, and I endeavor to apply this rule in thinking of this matter.

"But, although I have no detailed facts, I am quite certain of my premises. A Chinese influence of some sort has been at work to harm relationships between America and Japan."

"Does Japan entertain any political ambition with regard to the Philippine Islands?" I asked frankly.

"Absolutely no," said the viscount very promptly. "Japan watches the development of those rich islands under the extraordinary genius and energy of the Americans with interest, not envy."

We were interrupted at this moment by the entrance of a messenger who brought to the viscount an envelope strangely shaped to an American's eyes—cylindrical and very long. From it the viscount took a roll upon which a lengthy message had been painted in ideographic characters.

Reading it rapidly, after he had bowed with great courtesy to the messenger who had brought it, he bowed to him again, made some reply, and with more bows than I counted the messenger backed from the room. The small, courteous by-play was a bit of old Japan transplanted to the room of a prosaic metropolitan American hotel.

"And China?" I inquired when it was over.

"Toward China Japan feels much as she does toward the Philippines," the viscount answered. "We have been rather pleased than otherwise by the interest which America has shown in China, for where American influence is felt there lies progressiveness—and China needs that above all other things.

Japan Has Very Deep Interests in China

"Japan's interests in China, of course, are very deep. Since the two peoples have existed they have lived side by side in close geographical proximity. There are many travelers, of course, from each country within the other's boundaries, and, naturally, there are business overlappings.

"Therefore it is not unreasonable to suppose that American businessmen, going to China, should feel that Japan is trying to get special privileges and even making efforts along the lines of colonization. This, however, is by no means actually the case.

"In China Japan wishes that which her business enterprise may properly entitle her to have and nothing more, being, meantime, willing that businessmen from other countries should find there just what she may find—in other words, that they shall have entirely equal opportunities.

"Japan wishes to see China prosper and progress. Nations, like individuals, benefit through having prosperous and progressive neighbors.

"Japan hails with approval every effort of American business men to help China to develop. Japan seeks no especial privileges.

"That Chinese trade which Japan wins through utterly legitimate business efforts she will strive to keep, of course; that is the way of business. Beyond that there is nothing.

"Differences of opinion with regard to the Chinese situation have arisen chiefly, I am sure, through misunderstanding of the motives and procedures of Japan—again assisted by those influences which would be glad to see America and Japan handicapped by lack of understanding."

Japanese in California There by Invitation, He Says

It was the California situation which I brought next to the attention of the distinguished Japanese. My questions were quite frank and his answers were unhesitating.

"I am not well posted with regard to recent details," said the Viscount, "but the general situation, I believe, is clear to me, and I am glad to give my views of it, which I must be sure to say again, are those of an individual and have no official significance whatsoever.

"Japan realizes that the existence of large colonies of Japanese upon American soil, with complete differences of customs, manners and religion, inevitably must cause early difficulties. Japan knows that Japanese do not easily assimilate American modes of life.

"In other words, in the development of the California situation the matter now has reached that point at which each side principally sees the other's faults.

"It is not improbable that there may have been mistakes upon both sides. I cheerfully admit that there have been mistakes upon the Japanese side.

"Japanese who are completely well informed assure me that there are some points in the American procedure which need improvement or amelioration.

"Surely these two nations have minds broad enough, have imaginations keen enough, have energy and good will enough to study these points on both sides with full impartiality and to correct what errors need correction without quarreling over things which easily might be remedied.

"Eventually the Californians began to see the doubtless real danger which would be involved in an unrestricted acceptation of Japanese labor in the California labor market, and the result was the so-called 'Gentlemen's Agreement' of 1907, limiting Japanese emigration of laborers to the United States.

"But many Japanese already were upon the ground, and their favorable economic status continually roused new antagonisms.

Japanese Not Reconciled To California Situation

I asked the viscount if the Japanese at home had become at all reconciled to the California situation as it stands. He answered, frankly:

"No," said he, "they are not. They are not reconciled. The present situation of the Japanese in California is most unfortunate. They are laboring under many difficulties.

"The Japanese at home feel that the Japanese in California are being treated rather harshly, rather disagreeably.

"This being true, there naturally may come some resentment, or at least some restlessness, in the feeling of the Japanese at home toward California and, therefore, toward the United States.

"Of course, if the Japanese in California commit faults then the Japanese in Japan will not blame the Californians in correcting them.

"But my advice to the Japanese in California has been and is that they speedily shall adopt American ways, American thoughts, American customs; that they shall cease to hold clannishly together; that they shall endeavor to become an integral part of the life which surrounds them and not hold themselves aloof in wholly separate communities.

"But, even though the Japanese endeavor to do this, naturally they will feel badly if the people of California make all sorts of special restrictions against them.

Prejudice on Coast More Economic Than Racial

"I believe, as I have said, that the prejudice against the Japanese in California is far more economic than racial. But, at present, the Californians dislike the Japanese. The Japanese dislike those who dislike them. That is human nature.

"In this, some think, lies a misfortune, but, perhaps, they argue, also there may lie in it some solution of the difficulty, for, they say, it shows that now there is not any chance that Japanese will think of permanently making homes in California. They argue that no man makes a home where he dislikes and is disliked. They hold that all Japanese now feel that they are merely temporary residents in the United States.

"This is wrong. I shall tell the Japanese of California, when I go back there, that those born in California are really Americans and must adopt the customs and ideals of the United States.

"They must invest their money in this country; they must work for the state in which they live. If they but follow this course they will thus solve the economic differences which now give them advantages. They must not separate themselves as they do now."

Of the action of his country at the Washington conference the Viscount naturally would make no predictions.

"Japan," he said, "like the United States, now is unmercifully burdened by the great cost of armament. It would be absurd to think that Japan would not be glad to get out from under this great weight.

"With regard to that, however, I have this to say, of course: No one nation can stop arming if all others keep it up.

"If England, America, France and the others make agreements in this matter, I am certain that the Japanese will meet them with great satisfaction.

"One of the Japanese delegates to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament already has published the statement that Japan is not only willing but desirous of an adjustment of the whole matter on any basis which all powers may think reasonable.

"Japan gladly will accept any program which at once will relieve her of the great cost of armament and leave her safe against aggressive tactics of other powers in future."